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I. INTRODUCTION – THE BAGOT SCENARIO
Your adult son, though employed, is mentally handicapped.
Ordinarily, you drive him to and from work, but over the next
several weeks you will be out of town for a number of days. You
decide to have a particular taxicab company fill in for you, and you
make the necessary arrangements through a telephone call to the
company’s dispatcher.
You believe the cab company employs cab drivers as well as
dispatchers, and your belief comes from the company’s trade
name, trade dress, advertisements, signage, and published

† Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, A.B. Harvard
University, 1972; J.D. Yale School of Law, 1979. Professor Kleinberger appreciates,
as always, the guidance, insights and support of Carolyn C. Sachs, Esq.
†† Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, J.D. Harvard Law
School, 1983.
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telephone numbers. This appearance plays a role in your decision
to have this particular company dispatch drivers to transport your
son.
In due course, you leave town and the cab company dispatches
cabs to transport your son. Unfortunately, one of these cabs is
involved in an accident, the driver is at fault and your son is
injured. Only when you seek compensation from the taxicab
company for your son’s injuries do you discover that the company
does not in fact employ the drivers. Contrary to appearances, the
drivers in those distinctively marked cabs are all independent
contractors. The taxicab company denies any legal responsibility
for the driver’s negligence and for your son’s injuries.
Addressing precisely this scenario, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals concluded that the plaintiff could not proceed against the
1
taxicab company. In Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., the
court concluded that (1) the cab driver was an independent
contractor; (2) the taxicab company did not owe a non-delegable
duty of care to the plaintiff; and (3) Minnesota does not recognize,
through apparent authority, ostensible agency, or any other legal
doctrine, any basis for plaintiff’s claim against the defendant cab
2
3
company. One judge dissented, and the Minnesota Supreme
4
Court granted the plaintiff’s petition for further review. The
5
parties subsequently settled the case, and the Supreme Court then
6
dismissed the appeal.

1. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL
69489, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant taxicab company, and the plaintiff appealed. The introductory
scenario is based on the facts accepted as true by the district court for the purpose
of the summary judgment motion. Although the appellant “argue[d] that the
district court made inappropriate findings of fact,” the court of appeals ruled that
“[t]he facts presented to the district court were not disputed by the parties.” Id.
2. Id. at *3-*5.
3. Id. at *6 (Klaphake, J., dissenting).
4. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL
69489, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), petition for review granted, (Minn. March 27,
2001). The Supreme Court then took the unusual step of soliciting amicus briefs
from the three law schools then operating in Minnesota, and the authors of this
article filed a brief urging reversal of the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision.
5. Letter from Charles T. Hvass, Jr., counsel for Petitioner/Appellant, to
Daniel S. Kleinberger and Peter B. Knapp (May 11, 2001) (on file with the William
Mitchell Law Review).
6. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL
69489, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), dismissed, (Minn. May 15, 2001).
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF BAGOT
The issues raised by Bagot transcend both the case itself and
the taxicab situation. In our modern economy, more and more
service businesses present themselves to the marketplace as
economically integrated enterprises while using independent
contractors rather than traditional employees to provide the actual
7
service. Consider, for example, a scenario from the world of
health care.
A parent is considering whether to take a seriously ill child to a
free standing urgent care clinic or to the Emergency Room of the
region’s leading children’s hospital. The parent thinks, “The ER
staff is part of the hospital. They must be top notch.” That
thought helps the parent decide to entrust the child to the ER.
Unbeknownst to the parent, however, the hospital has “subbed out”
the ER function to a group of independent contractors. Nothing
in the hospital’s publicity, advertising or signage has disclosed this
fact. If the ER staff treats the child negligently, is the hospital
unaccountable as a matter of law for the appearance it created and
the role that appearance played in the parent’s decision to bring
8
the child to the ER?
Whatever the type of business, the actual relationship among
the parties is likely to fall within one of the following three
structures:

7. The phenomenon has caused problems in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that
ERISA benefits were available to workers whom the defendant claimed were
independent contractors), appeal after remand sub nom. Vizcaino v. United States
Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Wash., 173 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1999), op. amended on
denial of reh’g sub nom In re Vizcaino, 184 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1105, (2000). The phenomenon also occurs with businesses selling goods,
but that context is beyond the scope of this article. In such a context, liability
typically arises from breach of contract rather than negligence. Where liability
sounds in negligence, the doctrines of respondeat superior and apparent servant
(discussed here) are central to the liability analysis. Those doctrines are
inapposite to breach of contract claims.
8. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Alaska 1987) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957)); Clark v. Southview Hosp. &
Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
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Structure 1. Direct Service Provider is acting as servant employee
of Apparently Integrated Business:
Customer
Parent in Bagot
Parent of ER Child

Direct Service
Provider
Cab Driver
ER Staff

Apparently Integrated
Business
Taxicab Company
Hospital

Structure 2. Direct Service Provider is acting in non-servant
relationship (independent contractor) with Apparently Integrated
Business:
Customer
Direct Service
Apparently Integrated
Provider
Business
Parent in Bagot
Cab Driver
Taxicab Company
Parent of ER Child ER Staff
Hospital
Structure 3. Apparently Integrated Business is serving as a mere
intermediary to arrange a relationship between Customer and
Direct Service Provider:
Customer
Apparently
Direct Service
Integrated Business
Provider
9
Parent in Bagot
Taxicab Company
Cab Driver
Which structure fits a particular situation is both a question of
fact and a crucial legal characterization. Where Structure #1
applies, the Apparently Integrated Business is the “master” of the
Direct Service Provider and under the doctrine of respondeat superior
is automatically and inescapably liable for any negligence of the
Direct Service Provider which occurs “within the scope of
11
employment.” Where Structure #2 applies, respondeat superior has
10

9. Although arguably the situation in Bagot, this structure does not plausibly
fit the ER scenario.
10. See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290
(Minn. 1981) (stating that in a case determining whether an agent for an
undisclosed principal, such relationship may be shown by circumstantial
evidence); North Face Exteriors v. Comm’r of Jobs & Training, 457 N.W.2d 778,
780 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“Cases distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors are often factually close.”); Hagen v. Burmeister &
Assoc., Inc., No. CT-95-3634, 1999 WL 31130, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1999)
(stating that a factual determination is an essential element on retrial in
determining apparent authority).
11. Schneider v. Buckman, 433 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Minn. 1988); RESTATEMENT
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no role and the Apparently Integrated Business will be liable to the
12
Customer only if the Business has itself breached some duty.
Where Structure #3 applies, respondeat superior is again inapplicable
and liability vel non for the Apparently Integrated Business again
turns on whether the Business owes and has breached a direct duty
to the Customer. If the Customer was unaware that the Business
was serving as a mere intermediary, the Business will have the
13
liabilities applicable to an agent of an undisclosed principal.
The dismissal of the Bagot appeal resurrected the Minnesota
Court of Appeals decision, which, though unreported, is still quite
dangerous. Although unreported decisions lack precedential
14
15
value, they can be influential.
The potential for influence is
especially strong when the court announces that it can find no
Minnesota precedent to support an important principle of law.
The majority in Bagot made just such an announcement, rejecting
as without precedential foundation the appellant’s effort to hold
the taxicab company accountable for the appearances the company
16
had purposefully created.

(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957 Main Vol.). See generally DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER,
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS § 3.2, at 82–95 (1995)
[hereinafter KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP]. “Scope of employment” can
itself be a thorny issue, especially in cases of intentional torts. See, e.g., Hagen v.
Burmeister & Assoc., Inc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 2001) (“The general
policy, then, is that we will not impose such liability unless there is some
connection between the tort and the business such that the employer in essence
assumed the risk when it chose to engage in the business.”); see also KLEINBERGER,
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, §§ 3.2.5 & 3.2.6, at 88–95. In cases like Bagot, however,
scope of employment is typically clear. That is, if the cab driver had been indeed
the servant of the cab company, driving a customer would have been indisputably
within the scope of employment.
12. See KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, § 3.3.1, at 96
(explaining that if principal owes a direct duty of care to a third party, an agent’s
negligence may result in the principal’s breaching that duty of care); § 4.4.1, at
145-147 (explaining principal’s duty to properly select and use agents); § 4.4.2, at
147-148 (non-delegable duties imposed by other law); § 4.4.3, at 148 (duties
assumed by contract).
13. See discussion infra Part VII.
14. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08 subd. 3 (2001).
15. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, Guilty Knowledge, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 953,
954 (1996) (stating that “unpublished opinions . . . routinely influence both
lawyers and judges” and noting that “the Minnesota Court of Appeals sometimes
cites its own unpublished decisions, and even the Minnesota Supreme Court
occasionally discusses unreported cases”) (footnotes omitted).
16. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL
69489, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
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III. PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE
This article takes fundamental issue with Bagot and seeks to
demonstrate that:
(i) the agency law doctrine of apparent authority provides the
proper framework for understanding Bagot-type situations; and
(ii) Minnesota has well-established principles of apparent
authority that support applying that doctrine to such situations.
This article also presents an alternate theory of agency law for
resolving Bagot itself – namely, the liability of an agent for the
contract duties of a partially disclosed or undisclosed principal.
IV. APPARENT AUTHORITY AS THE ANALYTIC CRUX
The parties in Bagot jousted as to whether the cab driver was an
independent contractor, whether the taxicab company owed the
passenger a non-delegable duty of care and whether the cab driver
17
and the cab company were a joint enterprise. As to the latter two
issues, the court’s focus was misplaced. Once it sustained the trial
18
court’s finding that the cab driver was an independent contractor,
the court should have decided the appeal according to the doctrine
19
of apparent authority.
Apparent authority is a principle of agency law which attaches
consequences to the appearances created by a person’s conduct.
When an “apparent principal” makes “manifestations” to a third
person so that the third person believes the “apparent agent” is
actually acting on the apparent principal’s behalf, the apparent
agent has “the power . . . to affect the legal relations of [the]
20
apparent principal with respect to [the] third person.”
Apparent authority is a fundamental part of the common law
21
of agency and has an undeniable pedigree in the common law of
17. Id. at *1-*5.
18. Id. at *2-*3.
19. As discussed in Part I, infra, the court did consider Restatement (Second)
of Agency, section 267 and Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429, but
summarily rejected both sections as without precedent in Minnesota law.
20. Sauber v. Northland Ins. Co., 87 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Minn. 1958)
(“Apparent authority is the power of an apparent agent to affect the legal relations
of an apparent principal with respect to a third person by acts done in accordance
with such principal’s manifestations of consent to such third person that such
agent shall act as his agent.”).
21. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, § 2.1.2, at 17
(stating apparent authority is one of five major theories for determining a person’s
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22

Minnesota.
The doctrine’s modern foundation is the
23
Restatement (Second) of Agency, section 8, which has been
repeatedly cited and used by both the Minnesota Supreme Court
24
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
When the apparent principal creates the appearance of an
employer-employee relationship, the applicable concept is that of
25
“apparent servant.” In the Restatement (Second) of Agency, this
aspect of apparent authority appears in section 267:
One who represents that another is his servant or other
agent and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely
upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to
liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other
26
agent as if he were such.
Section 267 suffices to give plaintiffs like Bagot a cause of
27
action, but the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected section 267 as
unprecedented in Minnesota: “[A]ppellant supplies no authority
for the application of section 267 to Minnesota theories of recovery

power to create legal obligations for another person).
22. E.g., Truck Crane Serv. Co. v. Barr-Nelson, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 824, 827
(Minn. 1983); McGee v. Breezy Point Estates, 166 N.W.2d 81, 87-89 (Minn. 1969);
Hockemeyer v. Pooler, 130 N.W.2d 367, 375 (Minn. 1964); Sauber v. Northland
Ins. Co., 87 N.W.2d 591, 597-98 (Minn. 1958); Am. Parkinson Disease Ass’n v. First
Nat’l Bank of Northfield, 584 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957). “Apparent authority is the
power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third
persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with
the other’s manifestations to such third persons.” Id.
24. E.g., Associated Lithographers v. Stay Wood Prods., Inc., 279 N.W.2d 787,
790 (Minn. 1979); Duluth Herald and News Tribune v. Plymouth Optical Co., 176
N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1970); Lindstrom v. Minn. Liquid Fertilizer Co., 119
N.W.2d 855, 861-62 (Minn. 1963); Sauber v. Northland Ins. Co., 87 N.W.2d 591,
598 (Minn. 1958); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Three Rivers Co., 400 N.W.2d 811, 813
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
25. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, § 3.3.4 at 98.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957). See infra note 35 and
accompanying text for the tort law formulation of the rule.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267.
P, a taxicab company, purporting to be the master of the drivers of the
cabs, in fact enters into an arrangement with the drivers by which the
drivers operate independently. A driver negligently injures T, a
passenger, and also B, a person upon the street. P is not liable to B. If it is
found that T relied upon P as one furnishing safe drivers, P is subject to
liability to T in an action of tort.
Id. § 267 cmt. a, illus. 1.
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28

and we have found none.”
The research was deficient. The principles underlying section
29
267 have been part of Minnesota law since 1914 , when the
30
Minnesota Supreme Court decided Jewison v. Dieudonne. In that
decision the court stated:
Where there is a holding out of a . . . relation concerning
the control of a place where business is transacted and an
invitation extended, under such circumstances of
publicity as to warrant the inference that a person
subsequently injured therein through the negligence of
an employee of those in charge must have had the right to
believe that those extending the invitation were in control
of the premises, a recovery may be had without regard to
31
the actual existence of the . . . relation.
Jewison concerned the appearance of a partnership relation, but
the same principle applies when the appearance is that of master
and servant. In 1939, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly
connected Jewison and section 267, citing section 267 as an
established exception to “the ordinary personal injury case [in
which] the injured person does not rely upon authority of any kind
in getting hurt” and describing Jewison as involving liability from
“the continued use of defendant’s name in conduct of the
32
business.
Thus, to invoke section 267 for cases such as Bagot is to apply
rather than to create precedent. Moreover, section 267 does not
stand alone within Minnesota’s common law. Section 267 is merely
a particular application of the fundamental principle stated in
33
Restatement (Second) of Agency, section 8. Indeed, section 8
contains an example that could have been derived from
28. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL
69489, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
29. Considering the plaintiff’s claim under section 267, the majority in Bagot
wrote, “appellant supplies no authority for the application of section 267 to
Minnesota theories of recovery and we have found none. We decline to extend
Minnesota law by applying section 267 as requested by appellant.” Id. at *5.
30. Jewison v. Dieudonne, 149 N.W. 20 (Minn. 1914).
31. Id. at 20.
32. Schlick v. Berg , 286 N.W. 356, 358 (Minn. 1939) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 267).
33. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, § 3.3.4 at 98
(characterizing section 267 as an area where the doctrine of respondeat superior
meshes with the law of apparent authority). As for the prominence in Minnesota
case law of Restatement (Second) of Agency section 8, see supra note 24.
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Appellant’s view of the facts of Bagot:
The Ace Taxi Company employs no drivers but merely
receives orders from prospective passengers and puts “Ace
Taxi Company” on cabs owned and operated by
independent drivers.
One of these drivers collides
negligently with another automobile, damaging one of his
passengers who reasonably believed the Taxi Company to
be the employer. The Taxi Company is liable to the
34
passenger but not to the owner of the other vehicle.
V. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 429
In Bagot, the Court of Appeals also considered whether
plaintiffs could proceed against the taxicab company under section
429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. That section states:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform
services for another which are accepted in the reasonable
belief that the services are being rendered by the
employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor
in supplying such services, to the same extent as though
the employer were supplying them himself or by his
35
servants.
The section 429 theory met the same fate as the section 267
theory: “Minnesota has not explicitly or implicitly adopted section
429. Plaintiff has failed to articulate a case to extend current
Minnesota law, and as such, the [c]ourt finds that section 429 of
36
the Restatement of Torts is inapplicable.”
Although on this point the Minnesota Court of Appeals
correctly characterized Minnesota precedent, the absence of
precedent is immaterial. Section 429 is merely tort law’s analog to
section 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
Section 429’s wording does differ somewhat from the wording
of section 267, but the difference disappears when the sections are
applied. Section 267 makes apparent agency the product of
affirmative manifestation by the apparent employer, imposing

34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. e, illus. 11. (1957).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
36. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL
69489, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).

06_KLEINBERGER

1536

4/18/2002 5:03 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4
37

liability on “[o]ne who represents that another is his servant,”
while section 429 looks to the service recipient’s state of mind,
imposing liability when that person accepts those services “in the
reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the
38
employer or by his servants . . . .”
However, courts applying section 429 routinely insist that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the “ostensible principal” took some
action to create the plaintiff’s “reasonable belief.” For example, in
39
Osborne v. Adams, the court considered the liability of a hospital
for the actions of doctors, who were independent contractors
40
working in the hospital’s neonatology unit. Having cited section
429 as the basis for a claim of apparent authority or ostensible
agency, the court then examined each element of a three-part test
41
of liability. The third element considered whether the plaintiff
had a reasonable belief that the services received were provided by
42
the hospital. The first element, however, was characterized by the
43
court as “holding out.” Under this element the court performed a
section 267 type inquiry and examined the hospital’s marketing
efforts and other representations which gave rise to the plaintiff’s
44
belief that the services received were provided by the hospital.
The second element of the test was whether the plaintiff looked to
the hospital, rather than the individual physician to provide
45
services.
In essence, Osborne infused a section 267 concept into a section
429 case. In general, cases applying sections 267 and 429 yield
essentially indistinguishable rules and results. Indeed, one Texas
decision inadvertently reflected this jurisprudential amalgam by
46
citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 267.
The amalgam is more purposefully reflected in a recent
Indiana Supreme Court opinion, decided in the health care
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429.
39. 550 S.E.2d 319 (S.C. 2001).
40. Id. at 319.
41. Id. at 321-22.
42. Id. at 322.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 322.
45. Id. at 322; see also Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312,
322 (S.C. 2000).
46. Valdez v. Pasadena Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 43, 47 n.2 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1998).

06_KLEINBERGER

2002]

4/18/2002 5:03 PM

“APPARENT SERVANTS”

1537

context:
Courts that have held hospitals liable for the negligence
of independent contractor physicians under apparent
agency have sometimes referred to or adopted [s]ection
267, [s]ection 429, or both, and sometimes have not
referred to or adopted either [s]ection 267 or [s]ection
429. While the language employed by these courts
sometimes varies, generally they have employed tests
which focus primarily on two basic factors. The first factor
focuses on the hospital’s manifestations and is sometimes
described as an inquiry whether the hospital “acted in a
manner which would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be
negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital.”
Courts considering this factor often ask whether the
hospital “held itself out” to the public as a provider of
hospital care, for example, by mounting extensive
advertising campaigns. In this regard, the hospital need
not make express representations to the patient that the
treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a
representation also may be general and implied. The
second factor focuses on the patient’s reliance. It is
sometimes characterized as an inquiry as to whether “the
plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
47
prudence.”
In sum, the lack of Minnesota precedent for section 429 is
immaterial to cases like Bagot. The principles of section 267
parallel the principles of section 429, and section 267 is amply
supported by Minnesota precedent.
VI. APPARENT AUTHORITY AS GOOD POLICY
Applying the doctrine of apparent authority in Bagot-type
circumstances is more than merely consistent with precedent. The
apparent servant concept allows Minnesota’s common law to
respond appropriately to changing economic realities and is
therefore good policy.
The resilience of the common law comes, in part, from
applying established principles to changing circumstances. In our
47. Sword v. NKC Hosp., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 150-51 (Ind. 1999) (citations
omitted).
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modern economy, more and more businesses present themselves to
the marketplace as economically integrated enterprises while
substituting independent contractors for traditional employees.
The common law makes no objection to this development, which is
48
The common law does,
said to increase economic efficiency.
however, apply its doctrine of apparent authority to link economic
efficiency with social responsibility.
That link is proper and has implications far beyond claims of
passengers against taxicab companies. Consider, for example, the
hospital emergency room scenario presented at the beginning of
49
this article.
That scenario reflects an increasingly common
arrangement in modern health care.
50
For example, in Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, the court
considered whether an HMO was liable for the alleged negligence
of independent contractor physicians. Citing comment (a) of
section 267, the court stated:
In our opinion, because appellant’s decedent was
required to follow the mandates of HMO and did not
directly seek the attention of the specialist, there is an
inference that appellant looked to the institution for care
and not solely to the physicians; conversely, that
appellant’s decedent submitted herself to the care of the
participating physicians in response to an invitation from
51
HMO.
52
Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., involved a similar
situation. The court used a reliance test that, though not expressly
tied to section 267, was identical: Could the plaintiff demonstrate
53
“justifiable reliance?”
The defendant HMO argued that the
plaintiff could not establish justifiable reliance because she did not
54
choose the HMO. The court ruled that “where a person has no
choice but to enroll with a single HMO and does not rely upon a
48. Walter Kiechel, How We Will Work in the Year 2000, FORTUNE, May 17,
1993, at 38; see Bradford D. Duea, The Employee/Independent Contractor
Classification: Do Loan Officers Working with California Mortgage Brokers
Qualify as Statutory Independent Contractors?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 895, 901-02
(1995).
49. See supra Part II.
50. 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
51. Id. at 1235.
52. 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999).
53. Id. at 768-69.
54. Id. at 769.
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specific physician, then that person is likewise relying upon the
55
HMO to provide health care.”
Holding “apparent principals” responsible for the appearances
56
they create is neither radical nor burdensome. To avoid the rule’s
impact, a business need only avoid creating misunderstanding in
the minds of its customers. In the Bagot case, for example, the
following words would suffice, if voiced consistently by the
company’s employee dispatchers as well as by the independent
contractor drivers: “Taxicab company is just a dispatch service. The
57
cabs dispatched are independently owned and operated.”
VII. THE LAW OF PARTIALLY DISCLOSED AND UNDISCLOSED
PRINCIPALS AS AN ALTERNATE SOLUTION TO THE TAXICAB
SCENARIO
The taxicab company in Bagot characterized itself as acting as
an intermediary between customers and drivers by charging a fee to

55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Rhone v. Try Me Cab Co., 65 F.2d 834, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1933)
(holding that a taxi passenger injured by negligence of the cab driver could
recover from the independent registered owner of cab and from the non-profit
corporation who advertised the cab as its own and citing a preliminary version of
what became section 267 of the first Restatement of Agency); Middleton v.
Frances, 77 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Ky. 1934) (holding taxicab company liable for
independent cab owner negligence because owner permitted “to cruise”
displaying taxicab company’s name).
57. In Petrovich, the defendant HMO relied upon a disclaimer contained in its
subscriber certificate, which stated that the HMO physicians were independent
contractors. Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 767. The court held that the HMO was not
entitled to summary judgment of the apparent agency claim on the basis of this
disclaimer alone. Id. First, there was a factual issue as to whether the plaintiff had
received this information. Id. at 763, 767. Second, in light of evidence that the
HMO held itself out as the provider of health care, the court ruled that the trier of
fact “must therefore be permitted to weigh the conflicting evidence and decide
this issue based on the totality of the circumstances. Only a trier of fact can
properly determine whether plaintiff had notice of the physicians’ status as
independent contractors, or was put on notice by the circumstances.” Id. at 767.
One of the more recent cases touching on the efficacy of language disclaiming
apparent authority involves a claim brought against the provider of a for-profit
legal services plan. In Gonzalzles v. American Express Credit Corp., 733 N.E.2d
345 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000), the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims
sounding in apparent authority in part because of the existence of disclaiming
language in a handbook provided to plaintiff. Id. at 353. That language stated
that the participating attorneys in the plan were independent contractors and not
employees of the plan. Id.
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58

the drivers for arranging contracts of transport. The Minnesota
59
In such
Court of Appeals accepted that characterization.
situations, agency law provides a separate basis for holding the
taxicab company accountable for the actions of the cab drivers it
dispatches: the liability of an agent for a contract made for an
undisclosed or partially disclosed principal.
Restatement (second) of Agency section 322 provides: “An
agent purporting to act upon his own account, but in fact making a
contract on account of an undisclosed principal, is a party to the
contract.” Restatement (Second) of Agency section 321 similarly
provides: “Unless otherwise agreed, a person purporting to make a
contract with another for a partially disclosed principal is a party to
the contract.”
Given the facts assumed by the trial court for the purposes of
60
summary judgment, a contract may well have been predestined
when Mr. Bagot, Sr. telephoned the taxicab company to arrange
61
rides for his son. If, as the taxicab company contended, “[a]ny
contract, i.e., payment of a fare in exchange for transportation to a
62
location, was between the driver and the passenger,” then, when
the taxicab company accepted Mr. Bagot Sr.’s call and later
dispatched cabs, the company was acting either as:
63
1. a partially disclosed principal, if Mr. Bagot Sr. realized that
the taxicab company was merely an intermediary acting for an
58. See, e.g., Airport’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Its Summary Judgment
Motion at 1, Petition for Review, App. at 93, Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab
Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL 69489, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that
Airport provided insurance and dispatching to Ronald Brake in exchange for his
weekly payment).
59. Bagot, 2001 WL 69489, at *2 (“Brake entered into an oral agreement with
Airport Taxi requiring Brake to pay $230 per week in exchange for dispatch
service and insurance under Airport’s commercial insurance policy as an
‘additional insured.’”).
60. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
61. The corporation’s own view at least does not contradict this construction.
See, e.g., Airport’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Its Summary Judgment Motion at
3, Petition for Review, App. at 95, Bagot, 2001 WL 69489 (stating that “[a]ny
contract, i.e., payment of a fare in exchange for transportation to a location, was
between the driver and the passenger and not specifying the moment at which
that contract formed”) (copy on file with the authors).
62. Id.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(2) (1957). “If the other party
has notice that the agent is or may be acting for a principal but has no notice of
the principal’s identity, the principal for whom the agent is acting is a partially
disclosed principal.” Id.
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unspecified number of cabs “in the available mix of cabs;” or
65
2. an undisclosed principal, if — as seems more likely — Mr.
Bagot Sr. believed that he was making an agreement with the
taxicab company itself.
In either case, the taxicab company would be liable on the
contract with the taxi driver. To the extent the driver owed a
contractual obligation of safe driving to the customer, the taxicab
66
company would be liable for any breach of that contract.
Both the rule and its rationale are simple. An agent for a
partially disclosed or undisclosed principal is liable on the
principal’s contract with a third party. The third party is entitled to
hold accountable to the contract the only person whose identity
the third party knows at the time the contract is formed.
67
Minnesota law has recognized this principle for over 100 years,
68
and modern decisions show that the principle remains good law.
64. Airport’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to It’s Summary Judgment Motion,
Affidavit of Craig Allen Den Hartog at 7, Petition for Review, App. at 100, Bagot,
2001 WL 69489 (Copy on file with authors).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(3) “If the other party has no notice
that the agent is acting for a principal, the one for whom he acts is an undisclosed
principal.” Id.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 321, 322. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals did not consider, and it is beyond the scope of this article to address,
whether the taxicab driver owed his passenger a contractual duty of safe driving in
addition to the tort law duty to avoid negligence. There is at least some support
for finding such a contractual duty. See, e.g., Gradin v. St. Paul & D.R. Co., 30
Minn. 217, 219 14 N.W. 881, 882 (1883) (“Undoubtedly, in the ordinary carriage
of passengers, there is a contract express or implied, involving the obligation as a
matter of contract to carry safely and any negligence causing injury to the
passenger is a breach of the contract and gives a right of action upon it.”); 10 AM
JUR 24, CARRIERS § 949.
67. Kerr v. Simons, 207 N.W. 305, 307 (Minn. 1926) (“One acting for an
undisclosed principal binds himself.”); Gay v. Kelley, 123 N.W. 295, 295 (Minn.
1909) (“Where one party to a contract deals with another as principal, and
afterwards discovers that such party was in fact an agent for an undisclosed
principal, he may enforce the contract against such agent . . . .”), overruled on other
grounds by Englestad v. Cargill, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 284, 285 (Minn. 1983); Amans v.
Campbell, 73 N.W. 506, 507 (Minn. 1897) (“[A] person acting as agent for
another will be personally responsible if, at the time of making the contract in his
principal’s behalf, he fails to disclose the fact of his agency; that by reason of such
failure he becomes subject to all the liabilities, express or implied, created by the
contract, in the same manner as if he were the principal in interest.”).
68. E.g. Haas v. Harris, 347 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (“[W]hen
the agent acts for a partially disclosed principal or on his own for an undisclosed
principal, the agent is a party to the agreement and is liable on the contract.”)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 321, 322).
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Applying this precedent to economic entities such as the
taxicab company in Bagot will neither cause injustice nor work any
practical hardship. If the taxicab company had wished to avoid this
type of responsibility, it merely needed to make clear to its
customers that, “We are just an intermediary and are not
responsible for the quality of service. Your contract will be with
whatever cab driver shows up at your door.”
VIII. CONCLUSION
Minnesota law has long recognized the agency law principle of
apparent authority. Minnesota law also provides that an agent is
liable for the contractual obligations of an undisclosed or partially
disclosed principal. Both of these well-recognized principles
provided a basis for the plaintiff’s suit in Bagot, and both ought to
provide a basis for similar suits in the future.

